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Abstract
Background: Litigation documents reveal that pharmaceutical companies have paid physicians to promote off-label uses of
their products through a number of different avenues. It is unknown whether physicians and scientists who have such
conflicts of interest adequately disclose such relationships in the scientific publications they author.
Methods and Findings: We collected whistleblower complaints alleging illegal off-label marketing from the US Department
of Justice and other publicly available sources (date range: 1996–2010). We identified physicians and scientists described in
the complaints as having financial relationships with defendant manufacturers, then searched Medline for articles they
authored in the subsequent three years. We assessed disclosures made in articles related to the off-label use in question,
determined the frequency of adequate disclosure statements, and analyzed characteristics of the authors (specialty, author
position) and articles (type, connection to off-label use, journal impact factor, citation count/year). We identified 39
conflicted individuals in whistleblower complaints. They published 404 articles related to the drugs at issue in the
whistleblower complaints, only 62 (15%) of which contained an adequate disclosure statement. Most articles had no
disclosure (43%) or did not mention the pharmaceutical company (40%). Adequate disclosure rates varied significantly by
article type, with commentaries less likely to have adequate disclosure compared to articles reporting original studies or
trials (adjusted odds ratio [OR]=0.10, 95%CI=0.02–0.67, p=0.02). Over half of the authors (22/39, 56%) made no adequate
disclosures in their articles. However, four of six authors with $25 articles disclosed in about one-third of articles (range: 10/
36–8/25 [28%–32%]).
Conclusions: One in seven authors identified in whistleblower complaints as involved in off-label marketing activities
adequately disclosed their conflict of interest in subsequent journal publications. This is a much lower rate of   adequate
disclosure than has been identified in previous studies. The non-disclosure patterns suggest shortcomings with authors and
the rigor of journal practices.
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Collaborations between physicians and industry are integral to
medical research. However, some professional relationships with
drug and device companies may also impact the design [1] and
outcomes [2] of biomedical research, and the reporting of research
findings [3]. The question of how best to manage financial
conflicts of interest among physicians and scientists is hotly
debated. Rather than seeking to sever all ties [4], many
policymakers and expert bodies have recommended full disclosure
as the first step in any mitigation strategy [5]. However, this
approach depends on physicians being forthcoming, which may
not occur [6–9].
Prescribing drugs for purposes outside those approved by the
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA)—‘‘off-label’’ use—is
common in clinical practice and may be appropriate if well-
grounded in solid clinical trial findings [10]. Promotion of off-label
uses is a fertile area for investigating undisclosed entanglements
between researchers and industry for several reasons. First, while it
is illegal for companies to directly promote off-label uses, it is legal
for independent physicians to discuss such uses with their
colleagues. Second, because off-label uses by definition come with
no FDA guidance, and often little or no scientific foundation [11],
expert opinion may have considerable sway over prescriber
behavior [12]. Third, revenue from off-label use can be lucrative
for drug companies, sometimes dwarfing that derived from
approved uses [13]. These factors make physicians who are
willing to advocate off-label prescribing a valuable commodity to
pharmaceutical companies.
A growing number of companies have been investigated for
engaging in illegal off-label marketing, with the total combined
value of the settlements reaching billions of dollars [14]. To date,
government prosecutors have generally not targeted the expert
advocates the companies enlist [15]. However, the government’s
investigations routinely identify physicians and scientists paid by
manufacturers to deliver lectures and author peer-reviewed articles
that support off-label uses [16]. Using a list of physicians and
scientists identified by whistleblowers in a sample of off-label
prosecutions, we gathered publications authored by these advo-
cates following their reported relationship, and assessed the
adequacy of disclosures made in these publications.
Methods
Setting and Participants
We used complaints filed by whistleblowers in ‘‘qui tam’’ cases
brought under the US federal False Claims Act (FCA) to identify
authors who were compensated by companies allegedly involved
in off-label promotion. The FCA prohibits submission of false
claims to the government for reimbursement. Parties report
potential violations by filing a sealed, confidential complaint,
which the US Department of Justice (DOJ) investigates. If the
evidence supports the allegations, the DOJ may take over the
enforcement action, and the whistleblower’s complaint is usually
unsealed.
Using a search of DOJ press releases [17], media reports in
Lexis-Nexis (Dayton, Ohio) [18], and data from Taxpayers
Against Fraud, a non-governmental organization that tracks
federal fraud actions, we identified 23 FCA enforcement actions
from 1996 to 2010 relating to allegations of illegal off-label
marketing schemes in which complaints were unsealed because the
defendant settled the case or the government took a lead in the
investigation (21 settled by the end of our study period). There
were 48 unsealed complaints associated with these cases, which we
obtained via the DOJ website, federal court filings [19], and
contacting the lawyers involved.
We searched the complaints to identify physicians and scientists
allegedly paid by a pharmaceutical company as part of its off-label
marketing. There were 91 physicians and scientists in 26 different
complaints whose names, involvement dates (range: 1999–2007),
and role in the off-label promotional activities were described. We
recorded their affiliation with the manufacturer and the time
frame of that affiliation.
Since nearly all whistleblower cases against pharmaceutical
manufacturers are eventually settled, the complaints we examined
were not scrutinized in court. Thus, they remain allegations, and
some whistleblower reports may have identified physicians who
were not in fact recipients of payments, or may have been
inaccurate in other respects. However, in all cases, the DOJ had
reviewed the evidence (including the whistleblower complaints),
conducted its own investigation, and determined that the case was
strong enough to justify unsealing the complaint or having the
DOJ join the prosecution.
Medical Literature Search
To identify articles authored by the 91 physicians and scientists,
one of us (BW) conducted Boolean searches of PubMed [20] (in
June 2011) looking for matches between the person’s name and
one of the following: name of the defendant manufacturer; name
of the drug(s) at issue in the litigation; terms describing the class of
the drug (e.g., antiepileptic); or terms describing the therapeutic
specialties in which the drug was used (e.g., neurolog! or psych!). In
each search, the time window began six months after the earliest
date of the author’s affiliation with the manufacturer, and ended
36 months after the last mentioned date. The six-month mark
allowed for publication lag (opportunity to receive and edit proofs
on manuscripts already submitted, if it happened to be the
author’s first relationship with the pharmaceutical company); the
36-month mark corresponds to the International Committee of
Medical Journal Editors’ (ICJME’s) standard for the time period
over which a financial conflict of interest should be disclosed [21].
As a sensitivity analysis, we also limited the searches to twelve
months after the final reported date.
Assessment of Relatedness of Publications
After obtaining the full text of all articles identified through this
process, two of us (ASK, BW) independently reviewed each
publication to determine its relevance to the corporate relationship
mentioned in the whistleblower complaint. Specifically, following
Okike et al. [9], the articles were classified as ‘‘related’’ or
‘‘unrelated’’ to the drug(s) to which the author was linked in the
whistleblower’s complaint. We based this again on the ICMJE,
which calls for disclosure of ‘‘interactions with ANY [sic] entity
that could be considered broadly relevant to the work’’ [21]. Thus,
related articles covered any use of the drug at issue [22], discussed
diagnoses or diseases treated by the drug [23], and mentioned
other medications in the same therapeutic class or alternative non-
pharmaceutical therapies [24]. Unrelated articles addressed topics
in other fields or other drug classes [25–26]. Whereas in Okike et
al., related articles were further broken down into directly and
indirectly related articles, we chose not to pursue this subdivision
because articles in both categories should carry an appropriate
conflict of interest disclosure, if a financial relationship exists.
Reliability testing on the relatedness assessments showed
excellent agreement between the independent reviewers. Among
528 articles that underwent double review, there was 98%
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[SE]=0.02). Disagreements were resolved by consensus among
the investigators.
Outcomes: Assessment of Disclosures
For all related articles, we assessed adequacy of disclosures in a
four-step process. First, we determined whether the printed article
contained any disclosure, including formal conflict of interest
statements, statements of financial support for the study, and
acknowledgments (other than mere expressions of gratitude to
colleagues or personal assistants). Supplemental on-line disclo-
sures, if any, were obtained. Second, among articles with
disclosures, we identified those with declarations of no conflict.
Third, for the remaining articles, we determined whether the
disclosure mentioned the defendant manufacturer.
Finally, we analyzed disclosure statements that mentioned the
defendant manufacturer to determine whether the statement
adequately matched the author’s financial relationship described
in the whistleblower’s complaint. An adequate disclosure was
defined as one in which the existence of a financial relationship
between the author and defendant manufacturer, as revealed in the
complaint, was also stated in the published article. An inadequate
disclosure was defined as one in which a personal connection was
not mentioned. Two investigators (ASK, BW) independently
determined adequacy, with disagreements resolved by consensus.
We also calculated inter-rater reliability on this judgment. Among
105 disclosures reviewed, there was 90% agreement and the kappa
score was 0.78 (SE=0.06), indicating good-to-excellent agreement
[27]. As a companion analysis, we assessed disclosure rates among
articles we categorized as ‘‘unrelated.’’
Collection of Other Information on Articles and Authors
With respect to authors, we identified their primary clinical
specialty or scientific field from information available in their
publications and the complaint; for physicians, specialty was
confirmed through searches of on-line databases. We also
categorized authors by authorship position (sole, first, middle,
last). We categorized publications by type (trials/studies, reviews,
commentaries/editorials/letters) and noted whether they men-
tioned an off-label use in the title, abstract, or conclusion.
We used the Thompson Reuters database [28] to obtain citation
counts for the publications (as of July 2011) and the Journal Impact
Factors at the year of publication. Each citation count was divided
by the years since publication to obtain a time-adjusted measure.
Journal Impact Factors were unavailable for nine publications. For
an additional 28 publications, the Journal Impact Factor was not
available for the relevant year so we obtained it by contacting
journal offices or assigning the Journal Impact Factor from the
nearest year available.
Statistical Analysis
We calculated counts of authors and articles by the adequacy of
disclosure. For each characteristic of interest, we estimated a
hierarchical logistic regression model for the probability of
adequate disclosure that included independent random intercepts
for author and journal and fixed effects for article or journal
characteristic as appropriate (R software, version 2.12.2) [29]. For
example, in the analysis of author specialty, this model estimated
the odds ratio of adequate disclosure comparing articles authored
by specialists in surgery/urology, nephrology, neurology, or other
fields to psychiatrists, the reference group, accounting for the
correlated likelihood of disclosure for articles that were penned by
the same author or published in the same journal.
Results
Of 91 physicians and scientists in the complaints, 39 (43%)
authored 404 related publications, 16 (18%) authored 124
unrelated publications, and 51 (56%) authored no publications
in the period of interest. Fifteen of the 16 authors who published
the unrelated articles also published related articles. The 39
authors, and their 404 related publications, became our study
sample. These 39 authors emerged from complaints involving 18
drugs. The majority (11/18, 61%) were psychoactive compounds,
including antidepressants (e.g., escitalopram [Lexapro]), antipsy-
chotics (e.g., olanzapine [Zyprexa]), antiepileptics (e.g., oxcarba-
zepine [Trileptal]), and central nervous system stimulants (e.g.,
sodium oxybate [Xyrem]).
Author Characteristics
The 39 authors of related articles consisted of 13 psychiatrists,
nine nephrologists, seven surgeons/urologists, five neurologists,
two non-clinician PhDs, one anesthesiologist, one internist, and
one endocrinologist. The authors were alleged in the complaints to
have engaged in 42 relationships with the pharmaceutical
manufacturer (three authors had two or more different types).
The most common was acting as a paid speaker (n=26, 62%).
Authors also wrote reviews or articles on behalf of the company
(n=7), acted as consultants or advisory board members (n=3),
and received gifts/honoraria (n=3), research support funds
(n=2), and educational support funds (n=1).
The 52 physicians and scientists who did not author any related
publications allegedly engaged in 53 relationships. The most
common was receiving gifts/honoraria (n=30, 57%), followed by
acting as a paid speaker (n=21, 40%). One complaint referred to
a consultant or advisory board member relationship and another
complaint referred to research support.
Characteristics of Related Articles
The median number of related articles per author was 7
(interquartile range [IQR] 2–12). These articles included 258
studies or trials with original data (64% of articles), 97 clinical
reviews (24%), and 49 editorials, commentaries, or letters (12%).
Sixty-two (15%) articles were sole-authored; in 87 (22%), the author
appeared first and in 95 (23%) the author appeared last. The
median Journal Impact Factor was 3.6 (IQR 2.0–4.8) and each
article was cited a median of 2.5 times (IQR 1.0–5.5). Among the
404 related articles, 177 (44%) discussed an off-label use of the drug.
Adequacy of Disclosure
A total of 62 (15%) of the 404 related articles had adequate
disclosures and 342 (85%) had inadequate disclosures (Figure 1).
Among articles without adequate disclosures, 43% (148/342) had
no disclosure at all, 4% had statements denying any conflicts of
interest, 40% had disclosures that did not mention the manufac-
turer, and 13% had disclosures that mentioned the manufacturer
but inadequately conveyed the nature of the relationship between
author and manufacturer reported in the complaint. Table 1
presents some examples of adequate and inadequate disclosures.
Table 2 shows how the adequacy of disclosure varied according
to author and article characteristics in raw percentages, as well as
the odds of adequate disclosure in each of these categories after
adjusting for correlation of articles from the same author and same
journal. Psychiatrists had a higher rate of adequate disclosure
(26%) than other specialties, although after adjustment, we found
no significant differences among specialties in authors’ adequacy of
disclosure. Disclosure rates varied little across authorship positions,
or by whether the publication discussed an off-label use. Articles
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doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001280.g001
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Journal Impact Factors had consistently greater odds of adequate
disclosure than articles published in the lowest Journal Impact
Factor quartile, but this difference was not statistically significant.
In the raw data, commentaries appear to have the best rates of
disclosure, but after adjusting for confounding by multiple
publications from the same author, we found that commentaries
were significantly less likely have adequate disclosure compared to
articles reporting studies or trials (adjusted odds ratio=0.10; 95%
confidence interval=0.02–0.67; p=0.02).
Aggregating articles by author provides a different perspective
on the adequacy of disclosure (Figure 2). More than half (22/39,
56%) of the authors did not make an adequate disclosure in any
publication. All but three authors (36/39, 92%) had inadequate
disclosures in a majority of their publications, although there was
considerable heterogeneity in the disclosure behavior of the most
prolific authors. For example, among the 20 authors with more
than five publications, more than half (12/20, 60%) made an
adequate disclosure in at least one article. Among the six authors
with 25 or more articles, two authors never or nearly never
disclosed, but the other four disclosed in about one-third of their
articles (range: 10/36 [28%] to 8/25 [32%]).
Sensitivity Analyses
Restricting the analysis to publications that appeared 6–18
months after the latest date of the relationship reported in the
complaint (as opposed to 6–36 months) reduced the count of
related articles to 176, but did not change substantially the rates
reported in Table 2 (unpublished data). Our companion analysis
identified zero disclosures (out of 124) among unrelated articles.
Discussion
In this study, we focused on whistleblower complaints, the only
publicly accessible data that reveal the details of off-label marketing
arrangements between pharmaceutical manufacturers and physi-
cians. All of the relationships we identified were alleged by
whistleblowers with special knowledge of company practices,
although none of the complaints were subject to full trial and
evaluation by a judge or jury. We found that, of 91 authors who had
financial relationships with pharmaceutical companies in the
context of off-label drug marketing, 39 authored 404 related articles
in the three years following their engagement. However, only two-
thirds of those articles contained any type of disclosure statement,
one-quarter contained a disclosure statement that mentioned the
relevant pharmaceutical company, and one in seven made
disclosures that adequately described their relationship with the
manufacturer. Adequate disclosure was no more or less likely in
articles that discussed off-label uses. A majority of the most
productive authors made adequate disclosures some of the time.
The rate of adequate disclosure we observed is markedly lower
than rates detected in previous studies. For example, Okike et al.
examined orthopedic surgeons with financial ties to hip and knee
prosthesis manufacturers who presented or served as a committee
or board member at an annual professional meeting, and found
that 75% disclosed payments directly or indirectly related to their
research (80% for the 208 directly related presentations, 50% for
the 32 indirectly related presentations) [9]. Chimonas et al.
examined publications from a subset of these orthopedic surgeons
and identified disclosures in 50% of directly related and indirectly
related articles published in the year following the payments (50%
of the 52 directly related articles, 50% of the 34 indirectly related
articles) [8]. The much lower rate of disclosure we observed may
be due to consideration of authors from a range of clinical
specialties, or our focus on ties with the pharmaceutical industry.
Additionally, part of the difference may be attributable to the
targeted nature of our study: authors who are paid by industry to
support off-label uses may be especially poor disclosers.
Where does responsibility for this alarmingly high rate of
inadequate disclosure lie? These failures spanned many articles
Table 1. Examples of adequate and inadequate disclosure.
Descriptions Alleged in Qui Tam Complaints Article Type Disclosure in Peer-Reviewed Article
Adequate disclosure
‘‘[Author] received $94,250 in 2003 in payments
from AstraZeneca for his presentations.’’
Randomized trial of competitor
drug in same class
‘‘[Author] has previously been a consultant for,
and on the speakers’ bureaus of, AstraZeneca,
Bristol-Myers Squibb, Eli Lilly, Janssen, and Pfizer
Pharmaceuticals.’’
‘‘To convince doctors to prescribe Zyprexa at these extremely
high dosages, Lilly also funded the [author] study.’’
Consensus statement on use of
drug at issue and other drugs in class
‘‘[Author] has received honoraria and/or research
support from AstraZeneca, Bristol-Myers Squibb,
Glaxo, and Lilly.’’
‘‘[Author] … discussed the off-label use of Zonegran
for mood stabilization and the treatment of mania.’’
Retrospective chart review study
of drug’s use
‘‘[Author] has received grant/research support
from Elan Pharmaceutical and serves on the
speakers or advisory boards for GlaxoSmithKline
and AstraZeneca.’’
Inadequate disclosure
‘‘[Author] … has been paid to speak at a number of
CME events as well as non-CME events.’’
Trial of use of drug ‘‘None of the [author group] have any significant
financial involvement in any organization with a
direct commercial interest in the subject
discussed in the manuscript.’’
‘‘[Author] was paid $134,000 by AstraZeneca to assist
in the marketing of Seroquel to pediatric patients.’’
Trial of use of drug ‘‘This research study was supported, in part, by
NIMH grants MH58170 and MH56352 [to other
author], and MH63373 ([author]).’’
‘‘AstraZeneca retained [author] to do numerous off-label talks
and discussions on CME satellite and on-line programs…In
2003, AstraZeneca paid [author] $285,000 in return for his
presentations to physicians.’’
Review article in same field ‘‘A roundtable for the authors in preparation for
this supplement … was supported by
AstraZeneca Pharmaceuticals LP.’’
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001280.t001
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ignorant about what is required, may misunderstand the
relatedness of the paper to their financial entanglement, or may
be forgetful. The systematic nature of the non-disclosure, and
context in which these failures occurred—suspect marketing
activities that authors were paid to be a part of—suggest that
embarrassment or willful hiding may explain at least some of the
missing disclosures. However, this hypothesis is contradicted by
the fact that physicians who are involved in off-label marketing
activities tend not to face punishment by the DOJ or state medical
boards [15], or to view their participation as inappropriate [30].
It is clear that that journal practices play a role in inadequate
disclosure, because we found that some authors, including the
most prolific ones, made adequate disclosures in some articles but
not in others. It is unlikely that so many authors would engage in
this type of behavior on their own, since it creates a public record
of spotty disclosure that could be ascertained by searching and
cross-referencing the medical literature [31]. To systematize
practices, the ICMJE promulgated disclosure standards in 2009,
including a template that requires authors to disclose direct
support for the research, personal financial relationships, and
other interests [32]. Yet journals still diverge in their disclosure
requirements, and even in how they define a ‘‘conflict of interest’’
[33–34]. Journals also may inconsistently apply disclosure
requirements to non-data-driven commentaries, as compared to
reports of studies or trials. Indeed, our results reinforce other
research that has found low rates of adequate disclosure among
commentaries [35]. Our results, collected before the ICMJE
standards were published, show some of the consequences of
variable oversight by editors of biomedical journals.
Solutions to inadequate conflict of interest disclosure are not
straightforward. Some have called for civil liability [36], and a few
journals have threatened restriction of future publication [34].
Academic medical centers and universities have been a primary
locus of attempts at reform, with many developing conflict of
interest rules of varying intensity [37]. The Department of Health
Table 2. Association between adequacy of disclosure and characteristics of articles and authors.
Characteristic
Articles with
Adequate
Disclosure (N=62)
Articles with
Inadequate
Disclosure (N=342)
% with Adequate
Disclosure
Adjusted odds ratio
(95% CI)
a P value
Author specialty (# of authors)
Psychiatry (13) 52 150 26% [Ref] [Ref]
Nephrology (9) 4 49 8% 0.65 (0.006–72.5) 0.86
Surgery/Urology (7) 4 107 4% 0.07 (0.001–5.86) 0.24
Neurology (5) 1 13 7% 2.72 (0–20.550) 0.83
Other (5) 1 23 4% 0.005 (0–1.693) 0.42
Author’s placement
Only 10 52 16% 0.50 (0.07–3.69) 0.50
First 18 69 21% 1.9 (0.26–14.02) 0.53
Middle 19 141 12% 0.87 (0.11–6.75) 0.90
Last 15 80 16% [Ref] [Ref]
Type of article
Studies/trials 32 226 12% [Ref] [Ref]
Reviews 20 77 21% 0.38 (0.05–2.82) 0.35
Commentaries 10 39 20% 0.10 (0.02–0.67) 0.02
Mentions off-label use
No 37 190 16% [Ref] [Ref]
Yes 25 152 14% 0.53 (0.15–1.83) 0.53
Journal Impact Factor (quartiles)
b
Lowest (,2.04) 9 90 9% [Ref] [Ref]
Second (2.04–3.61) 16 86 16% 1.61 (0.62–4.22) 0.33
Third (3.61–4.81) 21 75 22% 1.81 (0.71–4.63) 0.21
Highest (.4.81) 16 82 16% 1.55 (0.59–4.02) 0.37
Article citation index per year since
publication (quartiles)
Lowest (,1.0) 16 86 16% [Ref] [Ref]
Second (1–2.5) 17 87 16% 2.34 (0.60–9.08) 0.22
Third (2.5–5.5) 18 81 18% 1.92 (0.54–6.91) 0.32
Highest (.5.5) 11 88 11% 1.66 (0.35–7.93) 0.52
CI=confidence interval; Ref=reference group.
aOdds ratio adjusted for correlation of articles from the same author and same journal.
bData missing for nine articles.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001280.t002
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medical schools to disclose financial arrangements that could
influence the work of government-funded researchers on their
faculties [38], although this policy appears unlikely to be fully
implemented [39].
While efforts by academic medical centers may enhance
disclosure by authors of medical journal articles, we found that
57% of the physicians in the whistleblower complaints published
no articles during the study period. Thus, manufacturers’ off-label
marketing strategies may often involve payments to physicians
who have influence in their local communities, rather than those
who engage in research or write articles related to practice. It is
also notable that non-authors were more often provided with gifts
or honoraria, while authors were more often paid as speakers on
behalf of the company. The different types of financial induce-
ments may reflect varying marketing roles played by physicians
who contribute to the medical literature and those who do not. If
academic medical centers tighten their policies about receipt of
payments from manufacturers, more companies considering an
off-label marketing strategy may continue to seek out such non-
academically affiliated experts. The Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act will require manufacturers to report their
physician payments to the government starting in 2013. This may
promote transparency of financial relationships among all
physicians, but its effectiveness will depend on the government’s
ability to make disclosures available in a timely and user-friendly
fashion, and to prevent ‘‘laundering’’ of funds through seemingly
neutral third-party corporations.
Our study has certain limitations. Our analysis is based on
authors identified from whistleblower cases concerning off-label
drug promotion. Rates and patterns of disclosure in this
population may spotlight a ‘‘worst’’ end of the spectrum.
Nonetheless, these authors are still capable of influencing
prescribing practices, and the citation rate of their articles and
the prestige of some of the journals in which their work was
published deepen concerns that they have done so. In addition,
while our results suggest deficiencies at both the author and
journal level, our data cannot precisely define the fraction of
deficiencies attributable to improper reporting by the author, as
compared to administrative error, policies, or other reasons arising
from the journal. This can be attributed in part to the fact that we
did not obtain information on the disclosure requirements of each
journal in the year of publication, nor did we have access to the
specific disclosure-related communications between the journals
and the authors. Finally, nearly all of the whistleblower complaints
were focused on making out a case of fraud by the companies, not
alleging or proving illegal activities on the part of the individual
physicians or scientists that formed the focus of our study. Thus,
the full range of payments to and interactions with individual
physicians and scientists may not have been disclosed, rendering
our account of these payments and interactions a lower bound on
their true extent.
Figure 2. Counts and proportions of articles with adequate disclosure, by author. Each vertical line is a unique author, and the y-axis
shows the number of articles published by that author. The extent of the vertical line above or below zero represents the frequency of adequate and
inadequate disclosure for each author.
doi:10.1371/journal.pmed.1001280.g002
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of conflict-of-interest disclosures made by authors who had been
paid by pharmaceutical manufacturers. That such failures
occurred in relation to off-label marketing schemes is especially
troubling. Because off-label use is an area of clinical practice in
which opinion is likely to be divided about appropriate care, the
views of high-profile ‘‘opinion leaders’’ may exert considerable
influence on prescribing practices [40,41]. Disclosure of financial
ties in these situations would give readers an opportunity to weigh
the potential for bias. Our findings suggest that approaches to
controlling the effects of conflicts of interest that rely on author
candidness and variable policing by journals have fallen short of
the mark. Readers are left with little choice but to be skeptical.
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Background. Off-label use of pharmaceuticals is the
practice of prescribing a drug for a condition or age group,
or in a dose or form of administration, that has not been
specifically approved by a formal regulatory body, such as
the US Food and Drug Administration (FDA). Off-label
prescribing is common all over the world. In the US,
although it is legal for doctors to prescribe drugs off-label
and discuss such clinical uses with colleagues, it is illegal for
pharmaceutical companies to directly promote off-label uses
of any of their products. Revenue from off-label uses can be
lucrative for drug companies and even surpass the income
from approved uses. Therefore, many pharmaceutical com-
panies have paid physicians and scientists to promote off-
label use of their products as part of their marketing
programs.
Why Was This Study Done? Recently, a number of
pharmaceutical companies have been investigated in the US
for illegal marketing programs that promote off-label uses of
their products and have had to pay billions of dollars in court
settlements. As part of these investigations, doctors and
scientists were identified who were paid by the companies
to deliver lectures and conduct other activities to support
off-label uses. When the same physicians and scientists also
wrote articles about these drugs for medical journals, their
financial relationships would have constituted clear conflicts
of interest that should have been declared alongside the
journal articles. So, in this study, the researchers identified
such authors, examined their publications, and assessed the
adequacy of conflict of interest disclosures made in these
publications.
What Did the Researchers Do and Find? The researchers
used disclosed information from the US Department of
Justice, media reports, and data from a non-governmental
organization that tracks federal fraud actions, to find
whistleblower complaints alleging illegal off-label promo-
tion. Then they identified the doctors and scientists
described in the complaints as having financial relationships
with the defendant drug companies and searched Medline
for articles authored by these experts in the subsequent
three years. Using a four step approach, the researchers
assessed the adequacy of conflict of interest disclosures
made in articles relating to the off-label uses in question.
Using these methods, the researchers examined 26 com-
plaints alleging illegal off-label promotion and identified the
91 doctors and scientists recorded as being involved in this
practice. The researchers found 39 (43%) of these 91 experts
had authored 404 related publications. In the complaints,
these 39 experts were alleged to have engaged in 42
relationships with the relevant drug company: the most
common activity was acting as a paid speaker (n=26, 62%)
but also writing reviews or articles on behalf of the company
(n=7), acting as consultants or advisory board members
(n=3), and receiving gifts/honoraria (n=3), research support
funds (n=2), and educational support funds (n=1). Howev-
er, the researchers found that only 62 (15%) of the 404
related articles had adequate disclosures—43% (148) had no
disclosure at all, 4% had statements denying any conflicts of
interest, 40% had disclosures that did not mention the drug
manufacturer, and 13% had disclosures that mentioned the
manufacturer but inadequately conveyed the nature of the
relationship between author and drug manufacturer report-
ed in the complaint. The researchers also found that
adequate disclosure rates varied significantly by article type,
with commentaries significantly less likely to have adequate
disclosure compared to articles reporting studies or trials.
What Do These Findings Mean? These findings show the
substantial deficiencies in the adequacy of conflict-of-
interest disclosures made by authors who had been paid
by pharmaceutical manufacturers as part of off-label
marketing activities: only one in seven authors fully disclosed
their conflict of interest in their published articles. This low
figure is troubling and suggests that approaches to
controlling the effects of conflicts of interest that rely on
author candidness are inadequate and furthermore, journal
practices are not robust enough and need to be improved. In
the meantime, readers have no option but to interpret
conflict of interest disclosures, particularly in relation to off-
label uses, with caution.
Additional Information. Please access these Web sites via
the online version of this summary at http://dx.doi.org/
10.1371/journal.pmed.1001280.
N The US FDA provides a guide on the use of off-label drugs
N The US Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality offers
a patient guide to off-label drugs
N ProPublica offers a web-based tool to identify physicians
who have financial relationships with certain pharmaceutical
companies
N Wikipedia has a good description of off-label drug use
(note that Wikipedia is a free online encyclopedia that
anyone can edit; available in several languages)
N The Institute for Medicine as a Profession maintains a list of
policies regulating physicians’ financial relationships that
are in place at US-based academic medical centers
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